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Susu, a common way of saving money in the majority of devel-
oping countries, has migrated to developed nations. Originating 
in the 18th century in Ghana and Nigeria, susu is an indigenous 
method of microfinance, benefiting poor and minority groups. 
Significantly, susu relies on social capital as collateral, enhanc-
ing solidarity and building community. When American public 
assistance programs deny benefits to immigrants, susu becomes an 
important source of savings. The differentiation of susu from other 
savings strategies in the United States is explored.
Key words: Susu, microfinance, micro small enterprises, finan-
cial gain, rotating saving and credit associations
Susu is a method for immigrants to establish credit in an 
economically adverse environment. Historically, indigenous 
savings strategies represent the continuation of economic self-
help, which indentured Africans brought to the U.S. In his 
iconic text, From Slavery to Freedom, John Hope Franklin (1980) 
chronicled a resourcefulness borne of necessity, as Africans ad-
justed to slavery, relying on custom and solidarity to survive. 
Ante-bellum mutual aid societies emerged throughout the 
South to provide health and life insurance, death benefits, and 
orphanages. Franklin noted that such societies "served as im-
portant training grounds where Negroes could secure busi-
ness experience, and they helped develop habits of self-help 
that seemed to be more imperative as the new [20th] century 
opened" (p. 289). That these organizations emerged was a 
testament to human perseverance in the face of unremitting 
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, September 2016, Volume XLIII, Number 3
121
Sept.2016.indd   121 8/5/16   1:06 PM
122    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
brutality. As Edward Baptist (2014) chronicled, 
Slavery also killed people, in large numbers. From those 
who survived, it stole everything. Yet the massive and 
cruel engineering required to rip a million people from 
their homes, brutally drive them to new, disease-ridden 
places, and make them live in terror and hunger as they 
continually built and rebuilt a commodity-generating 
empire—this vanished in the story of a slavery that 
was supposedly focused primarily not on producing 
profit but on maintaining its status as a quasi-feudal 
elite, or producing modern ideas about race in order to 
maintain white unity and elite power. (p. xix)
Denying African slaves the opportunity to sustain themselves 
economically, in other words, was one component in the logic 
of King Cotton, which provided Southern plutocrats with the 
capital needed for American industrialization. 
As slaves brought with them indigenous practices that sus-
tained them before the Civil War, that pattern continued as 
recent immigrants have employed susu to prosper, a necessity 
in light of the (d)evolution of modern welfare states. Although 
the welfare state was initially justified to reduce risk, espe-
cially during periods of family financial uncertainty, in recent 
decades, economic inequality has risen to a level reminiscent 
of the Gilded Age, a century ago (Piketty, 2013). A demo-
cratic polity is imperiled as wealthy, well-connected interests 
manipulate public policy toward their ends, shortchanging 
the less affluent (Stiglitz, 2012). In advanced economies, the 
welfare state, through government social programs, has been a 
primary source of assistance to the welfare- and working-poor. 
"By its nature, capitalism produces too much economic insecu-
rity. A hallmark objective of welfare state institutions is, there-
fore, to reduce economic insecurity" (Garfinkel, Rainwater, & 
Smeeding, 2010, p. 2) noted prominent welfare philosophers. 
Additionally, 
social welfare transfers from one to another part of the 
population make up the lion's share of the budgets of 
all rich nations and amount to 30 to 40 percent of the 
total value of goods and services produced in most 
of these nations. (Garfinkel, Rainwater, & Smeeding, 
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According to the welfare state scenario, technical solutions 
through changes in government policies can restore econom-
ic opportunity to the less fortunate and ensure a measure of 
fairness (Atkinson, 2015). Yet, the welfare state, as an engine 
of equality, stalled after the 1970s when taxes reached their 
zenith; subsequent social obligations could only be met through 
deficit spending (Plender, 2015). Toward the end of the 20th 
century, public debt was handicapping the ability of national 
governments not only to meet social program commitments, 
but also to address recessionary periods. Public assistance 
benefits to the poor competed with social insurance benefits to 
the middle-class, often being side-tracked as a result of weak 
political influence. The capacity of government to address 
economic inequality was stretched to the breaking point by 
the Great Recession of 2008. While many governments insti-
tuted Keynesian stimulus spending to reboot their economies, 
this proved inadequate. At its height in the U.S., the federal 
stimulus boosted the economy only 1.6 percent (Krugman, 
2013); subsequently, millions of Americans struggled to rec-
oncile stagnant wages with household expenses, although the 
Great Recession had technically ended in 2009 (Stiglitz, 2015). 
Indeed, for the first time, the median income of the bottom 90 
percent of households actually fell, despite economic recovery 
(Reich, 2015). 
In addition to these factors, federal social policies became 
adversarial with respect to immigrant populations, especial-
ly those who were low-income. The welfare reform of 1996 
denied aid through Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
to immigrants for a period of five years. Subsequently, federal 
legislation has impeded immigrants from receiving benefits 
from many public assistance programs targeting the poor. 
"As a result, the participation of immigrants in public benefit 
programs decreased sharply after passage of the 1996 welfare 
reform law, causing severe hardship for many [poor im-
migrant] families who lacked the support available to other 
low-income families," concluded the National Immigrant Law 
Center (2010). Denied access to public assistance, poor im-
migrant households had little recourse but to be even more 
resourceful.
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Thus, despite evidence that immigrants do not represent a 
fiscal drain on welfare states (Somin, 2014), national govern-
ments tended to respond by denying public assistance benefits 
to immigrant families. Capital accumulation having become 
increasingly problematic due to adverse policies, low-income, 
immigrant households have had little choice but resort to in-
digenous savings strategies. Fortunately, these are readily 
available, since rotating savings groups are part of their cul-
tural heritage. Unfortunately, asset limits codified through 
conventional social policy often punish those engaged in such 
strategies by effectively prohibiting savings.
Susu
In light of a worsening economy and declining public 
support, many immigrant households turned to susu, already 
an integral part of their communities. Susu is a form of 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (RoSCAs) through 
which people agree to save a predetermined amount over a 
specific period of time, at the end of which the total amount 
is dispersed to a member; the next cycle provides a benefit 
to another member of the group. For example, a susu would 
be formed by a group of ten, committing to contribute $100/
month for a year; the beneficiary would receive $12,000, suf-
ficient to buy a used car or make a down payment on a home. 
Table 1. RoSCA/Su-Su System Based on 5 Participants with 
Monthly Payments of $100






Paid = Net gain 
(Loss)
 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5   
P1 
(Organizer) 100 100 100 100 100 500 0
P2 100 100 100 100 100 500 0
P3 100 100 100 100 100 500 0
P4 100 100 100 100 100 500 0
P5 100 100 100 100 100 500 0
Adapted from Ardener (2014).
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 An indigenous form of savings, susu places a premium 
on group solidarity, evident in the selection of a leader whose 
responsibility is management of group savings. Notably, susu 
is an informal arrangement, disconnected from mainstream 
institutions, such as banks or welfare. As an indigenous form 
of savings, susu has become an important part of the econom-
ics of immigrant communities, especially as immigrants have 
negative experiences with banks or credit unions and are ex-
cluded from benefits from public assistance programs.
A typical susu consisting of five members contributing 
$100 monthly would pay out $500 every five months, a total of 
$2,500. This scenario is indicated in Table 1.
Susu is notable in several respects. First, participants in 
susu commit to a savings plan that requires self-discipline, spe-
cifically budgeting, which may prove difficult in light of the 
expense shocks experienced by indigent immigrants. Second, 
group solidarity both encourages members to stay current 
with contributions while dissuading the organizer, who holds 
savings, from stealing group savings. A Chinese RoSCA, hui, 
in New York City was reported to have reached $200,000 when 
the organizer fled; members subsequently hired gang members 
who murdered the thief (Fan, 2015). Third, because susu oper-
ates outside the formal economy, financial gain is not reported 
as income, so taxes are evaded; however, by the same token, 
a credit history becomes difficult to establish for participants.
Variations in Susu
Susu, common in many Caribbean, South American and 
African countries, seems to have originated in Africa. Unlike 
pyramid schemes where those at the top of the system profit 
from those at the bottom, susu ensures that everyone contrib-
utes equally and in turn receives an equal payment. In Guyana, 
the "box" is one of the oldest informal pooled financing mech-
anisms that caters to the needs of marginalized business en-
trepreneurs. Practiced mostly by Afro-Guyanese women, this 
form of saving is usually organized by groups of individuals 
each of whom contributes (throws) a pre-determined amount 
of money to a pool on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis, 
for a predetermined period. During this period, each member 
of the group receives the total sum of the pool (also called a 
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draw) at the end of the time interval chosen by the group, until 
each person would have received their draw. The process is 
then repeated.
Although susus are similar globally, variations have 
evolved. In Jamaica, the pool is run for 15 weeks and each week 
one of the fifteen members gets paid. Then an extra week is 
added, week 16, for consideration of the individual who orga-
nized the susu. Sometimes members may fall short of their con-
tribution for a week or two, and the individual who organized 
the susu is responsible for filling in that missing amount so that 
no one is ever short of their full share of payment. In Jamaica, 
potential members must work or they cannot be involved in 
the susu. This is done for two reasons. First, it ensures the 
group that the member has the means to cover his/her contri-
bution. Second, most people are tied to their jobs. If someone 
wants to take their share and leave, they can easily move, but 
it would be a little more difficult for them to change their place 
of employment. In the event that someone wants to take their 
share and run, the leader or members of the pool would know 
exactly where to locate them in order to retrieve those funds.
In Kenya, susu is called "merry-go-round" or in native lan-
guage, chama. Members of the same family, co-workers, friends, 
and church members agree to contribute a fixed amount, often 
beginning at 100 shillings (US $1.30), pool the money, and give 
a designated member the proceeds at the end of the cycle. The 
pooling of money is done on a weekly or monthly basis de-
pending on members' agreement and their financial situation. 
Since the majority of the chamas do not have set rules, they 
are operated wholly on trust; however, the least trustworthy 
member stands to receive the money last. Chama has become 
so large that the Kenya Association of Investment Groups has 
written a handbook to promote best practices and lobby for 
network expansion (Kara, Kanyl, & Weru, 2014). 
Household Finance for Immigrants 
Despite its indigenous origins, susu represents a form of 
savings, which is related to anti-poverty efforts in the U.S. As 
Michael Sherraden (1991) observed, most public assistance is 
consumption oriented, benefits being at such low levels that 
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they are quickly exhausted. Compounding the consumption 
orientation to public assistance, means-tested eligibility re-
quirements for programs, such as Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families, Supplemental Security Income, and Medicaid, 
actually prohibit low-income households from saving minimal 
amounts, often $2,000. As noted above, many immigrants are 
disallowed public assistance for a period of at least five years.
Sherraden's concept of Individual Development Accounts 
(IDAs)—dedicated, matched savings for buying a first-time 
home, finishing vocational school or college, or starting a busi-
ness—departs from the consumption focus of public assis-
tance by encouraging the poor to save. Subsequently, in 1998 
the Assets for Independence Act was passed, authorizing $125 
million over five years to subsidize IDAs. Efforts to expand 
asset-building savings strategies through a universal child 
saving account have been unsuccessful, leaving public aid fo-
cusing on consumption as opposed to savings.
In contrast to the public sector, private financial activities 
have been largely ignored as regards low-income households, 
the presumption being that these are beyond the purview of 
government. The exception has been Alternative Financial 
Services (AFS), including check-cashers, payday and auto title 
lenders, pawnshops, rent-to-own furniture and appliances, 
and buy-here-pay-here used car sales (Stoesz, 2013). Advocacy 
organizations, such as the Center for Responsible Lending and 
the National Consumer Law Center, have cited abuses of AFS 
vendors, especially regarding high fees and interest, petition-
ing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for stiffer regu-
lation (Stoesz, 2014). AFS has expanded during recent decades 
as low-income consumers, desperate to pay routine bills as 
well as emergency bills, have been unable reconcile expens-
es with income. In effect, AFS subsidizes consumption at the 
expense of savings.
In light of the options available to the immigrant poor, susu 
represents a functional solution to family finance. When public 
assistance is not available, and AFS is accessible but costly, 
savings options are limited to IDAs, which are not universally 
available; hence, susu becomes a viable savings strategy. These 
options are classified in Table 2.
In this respect, susu represents an important addition to the 
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array of financial services and welfare programs available to 
low-income households. By emphasizing savings, susu serves 
as a substitute for consumption-oriented services and pro-
grams. As a private voluntary initiative, susu avoids the high 
fees and interest of Alternative Financial Services.















Integration with Mainstream Finance 
Despite the merits of susu, its relationship with mainstream 
financial institutions has been problematic. Here, the banking 
experiences of the poor in developing countries are instruc-
tive, where savings groups, in various forms, have become 
common (Sutton & Jenkins, 2007). By and large, commercial 
banks in developing countries still fail the low-income major-
ity, although some of the banks have been working to change 
the picture (Rhyne, 2009). The poor are often precluded from 
opening traditional bank accounts due to high transaction 
fees, required minimum deposits, and the physical distance 
between the client and the bank; in spite of this, the poor still 
find ways to save, often through traditional networks and in-
stitutions (Sutton & Jenkins, 2007). Commercial borrowing 
can be expensive; the borrower will have to pay back the loan 
itself, plus pay additional interest on the amount received. 
Thus, borrowing can also be risky, difficult, and stressful (Rim 
& Rouse, 2002).
Moreover, access to available bank financial products has 
been limited. In the Philippines, there is only one savings 
account for every three adults; in Kenya the ratio is one for 
every fourteen (perhaps explaining why susu savings clubs are 
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so popular in Kenya) (Rhyne, 2009). For many people, being 
able to save money for a rainy day poses difficulty when they 
are faced with their everyday needs. But being involved in 
a group makes it easier for themselves, along with others, to 
pool their resources and be able to support each other, while 
at the same time avoiding high interest rates and credit repay-
ment fees. In this respect, the Grameen Bank has become iconic 
as a peasant-friendly commercial financial institution that 
serves the poor, especially rural women. Since inception, the 
Grameen Bank has loaned US $18.9 billion with a repayment 
rate above 98 percent; 8.9 million borrowers have taken out 
loans (Grameen Bank, 2016).
Susu has been especially relevant to housewives who are 
often responsible for handling family finances (Sarpong & 
Adusei, 2014). Since many of the peer-to-peer lenders refuse to 
make loans to businesses, susu becomes an important source of 
investment for entrepreneurs. The problem for entrepreneurs 
is that an individual loan shows up as a debt on their credit 
report, which may lower their credit score. Susu avoids this 
problem through a scheme that is group savings, not borrow-
ing. Yet, because susu is informal, it prevents participants from 
building a credit history, which is predicated on borrowing 
(Peavler, 2015), hence the importance of collaborating with a 
bank, such as Barclays, in order to build a credit history.
In Ghana, Barclays works with traditional susu collectors, 
who act as "walking saving accounts." By offering a range of 
services via the susu collectors, Barclays has raised awareness 
of formal savings mechanisms, given clients greater securi-
ty, and enabled them to build their credit profiles (Sutton & 
Jenkins, 2007). A major component of finance for urban poor 
entrepreneurs in Ghana, particularly apprentices and artisans, 
has been the daily or weekly contribution of fixed amounts 
through susu. These savings are accessed after a period of time 
and used for purchasing tools and equipment necessary for 
setting-up artisans in their vocational practices (Alabi, Alabi, 
& Ahiawodzi, 2007). Evolving peer-to-peer lending, where 
the goal is to help out individuals with an affordable loan, 
the Susu Collectors Association has worked with Barclays to 
extend credit to low income households. Barclays anticipates 
replicating the model elsewhere in Africa. But Barclays Ghana 
Susu: Capitalizing Development 129
Sept.2016.indd   129 8/5/16   1:06 PM
noted that a truly financially inclusive society can only be 
achieved by supporting existing indigenous financial institu-
tions that already provide financial services. Barclays has been 
among the few banks that have adopted the susu concept as a 
micro-finance product (Alabi et al., 2007). 
Financial literacy is of utmost importance in order for any 
person or group to be financially successful; hence, mainstream 
institutions have promoted financial literacy. Clients and po-
tential clients with little exposure to formal banking may not 
fully understand fee structures or interest charges. Trust in 
financial institutions has been low; as a result, commercial 
financial institutions undertake financial literacy programs 
to build confidence with consumers. Citigroup has provided 
general financial literacy education in the United States and 
abroad, focusing on topics such as responsible use of credit 
cards, using employee volunteers and paper- and web-based 
methods. For instance, Citibank China, as part of a 10-year 
$200 million effort, launched a comic book stressing the im-
portance of sound financial judgment. Deutsche Bank pro-
vides financial literacy training targeted specifically at clients 
of the microfinance institutions in which the company invests. 
Similarly, Barclays trains the savings clients of its traditional 
susu collectors. 
Significantly, Barclays is among the few banks that have 
adopted susu as a micro-finance product, compensating for 
the failures of susu companies that emerged during the 1980s 
(Areetey, 1998). Such programs strengthen local money man-
agement knowledge and skills, enabling communities to use 
financial services effectively to expand their economic oppor-
tunities. Remittances are another financial product that have 
been associated with susu (Sutton & Jenkins, 2007). In Guyana, 
monies were sent to families abroad who were able to make 
susu contributions. Technology has further evolved susu by in-
troducing mobile banking. From a client base of 500, Financial 
Republic, a micro-finance company, now serves more than 
3,000 active customers, with almost the same number having 
benefited from the company's range of products and services, 
as reported by Elvis Gyasi, Director of Financial Republic: 
We are in this business to augment government's efforts 
at bridging the gap between the banking population 
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and the unbanked, as well as poverty alleviation as 
enshrined in the Millennium Development Goals, to 
provide financial services to the informal sector—that 
is, to empower our clients by encouraging a savings 
culture and providing micro-loans in a cost-effective 
and sustainable manner. (African Business Magazine, 
2012, para. 10)
Conclusion
Indigenous methods of savings represent an important 
way for marginalized communities to accrue assets for per-
sonal and business purposes, a compelling development 
given the exclusion of immigrants from public welfare ben-
efits. Depictions of such economic activity as "fringe economic 
behavior" (Kindle & Caplan, 2015) fail to reflect not only the 
constructive aspect of RoSCAs, but also the fact that immi-
grants have few other means for accruing capital. Typically, 
poor households fail to receive public assistance; currently, 
only one-third of low-income households receive aid (Fusaro, 
2015), although the percent of poor immigrants is certainly 
lower. As a result, many poor families resort to AFS providers, 
who attach high fees and interest to credit (Stoesz, 2014).
As alternatives to traditional public assistance, innovators 
have experimented with savings strategies that use solidar-
ity as collateral. Indeed, the Family Independence Initiative, 
developed by Maurice Lim Miller, awards groups of families 
according to self-reports of accomplishments relating to five 
areas: income, education, health and housing, leadership, and 
networking. Families can earn up to $600/quarter, sufficient to 
contribute to upward mobility (Stuhldreher & O'Brien, 2011). 
As support for savings strategies flags, private sector innova-
tions that capitalize on solidarity become attractive alterna-
tives to conventional public assistance. Combined with IDAs 
and the refundable tax credits, such as the Earned Income and 
Childcare Tax Credits, solidarity-based strategies not only 
promote upward mobility, but also evade the crippling asset 
limits of means-tested public assistance. As the welfare state 
is less capable of addressing the economic needs of lower-in-
come Americans (Stoesz, 2016), alternative sources of capital 
accumulation become essential to alleviate poverty.
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